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Abstract  
Drawing on Charles Taylor’s concept of ‘social imaginary’ - the kind of collective 
understanding a group has to have in order to make sense of their practices -  the article argues that 
the contradictions in the Indian Supreme Court’s interpretations of Hindutva and Hinduism and in the 
Indian state’s management of religious diversity stem from the inability of the Constitution to 
reconcile three different imaginaries of Hinduism – as a religion, culture and an ancient order. But 
these contradictions, while stoking discord, have also provided a buffer zone for the state from such 
conflicts.   
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Resumen  
Partiendo del concepto de ‘imaginario social’ de Charles Taylos –es decir, el tipo de 
comprensión colectiva que un grupo debe tener para darles sentido a sus prácticas– el artículo sostiene 
que las contradicciones que emergen de las interpretaciones de la Corte Suprema de la India y del 
Hinduismo y de la gestión de la diversidad religiosa del Estado de la India proceden de la incapacidad 
de la Constitución de armonizar tres diferentes imaginarios del hinduismo –como una religión, una 
cultura y una antigua orden–. Sin embargo, además de fomentar el desacuerdo, estas contradicciones 
también proporcionan una zona franca para el estado de estos conflictos.   
  
  
Palabras clave  





The continuing relevance of religious beliefs and politicized religion in countries like India 
where economic liberalization has marched alongside muscular nationalism (or in Charles Taylor’s 
words, confessionally defined nationalism), requires us to revisit the claim that secularization – the 
process of the emergence of an ‘unbelieving ethos’ or the decline/privatization of religion – occurs 
with modernization. Since the 1990s, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its battlecry of Hindutva  
–  a literal meaning is Hindu-ness – has been a forceful contender in India’s political arena, having 
led coalition governments in 1996, and 1998-2004, and a majority government from 2014. The  
Indian Supreme Court’s judgments in three recent cases illuminate the problems caused by politicized 
religion. In 1996, two cases (henceforth Hindutva Case) were heard together by the Supreme Court 
of India on whether the use of the term ‘Hindutva’ in election speeches by the winning candidates 
was illegal because it pertained to religion, and contravened a law that forbade the use of religious 
rhetoric in election speeches.2 In response, the two politicians (Prabhoo and Joshi) who belonged to 
the Shiv Sena party (also part of the family or coalition of Hindu chauvinist parties and organizations 
that include the BJP and the RSS) argued that the concept of Hindutva was cultural and nationalistic 
rather than religious. Citing the difficulty of defining a Hindu, the  
Chief Justice of India, J.S.Verma concluded that the term ‘Hindutva’ and ‘Hinduism’ could not be 
equated with narrow fundamentalist religious bigotry.   
  
«Ordinarily, Hindutva is understood as a way of life or a state of mind and it is not to be 
equated with, or understood as religious Hindu fundamentalism… the word 'Hindutva' is used and 
understood as a synonym of 'Indianisation', i.e. the development of uniform culture by obliterating 
the differences between all the cultures coexisting in the country….» (par. 40)  
  
The answer to whether the use of the word ‘Hindutva’ in an election speech is religious or not 
depends on the context, said the judgment. The mere word itself ought not to be narrowly construed 
as a religious term “unless the context of a speech indicates a contrary meaning or use”.  
                                                 
1 I am grateful to Subhadra Banda for research assistance.  
2 Dr. Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo vs. Prabhakar K. Kunte AIR (1996) SC 1113; Manohar Joshi vs. Nitin Bhaurao Patil  
(1996) 1 SCC 169. The Constituent Assembly’s decision that religion would be delinked from politics was codified in 




In the abstract, said the Court, “these terms are indicative more of a way of life of the Indian people 
and are not confined merely to describe persons practicing the Hindu religion as a faith.”3 In the case 
of Prabhoo, the court ruled that the speeches amounted to corrupt practices under the Act, while in 
Joshi, it did not. In the latter case, the court equated Hinduism – which it saw as  
‘Indianisation’ or culture – with Hindutva, which was deemed to be non-religious nationalist rhetoric.   
None of the earlier judgments had equated ‘Hindutva’ with ‘Hinduism’. The judgment was 
criticised for giving legitimacy to Hindu nationalist ideology, with the upshot being Hindutva = 
Hinduism = way of life and not a religion = Indianisation = development of a uniform culture, even 
if the judges themselves may not have meant to say so.4 Not surprisingly, the Hindu right viewed the 
ruling as giving judicial imprimatur to ‘Hindutva’ as an ideology that expressed nationalism and 
Indianness rather than a religion, and legitimizing its use in politics.5 What made the Hindutva 
judgment even more ironical is that in a previous judgment (Bommai v Union of India), the  
Supreme Court recognized the potential of ‘Hindutva’ as a divisive religious mobilizing concept.6 In 
Bommai, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of the dismissal of several BJP-led state 
(subregional) governments for participating in unsecular activities. The dismissal came in the wake 
of riots between Hindus and Muslims in these states following the destruction of an ancient mosque 
in northern India. The Court ruled that a state government pursuing an unsecular policy was acting 
contrary to the constitutional mandate and could be dismissed under Article 356. ‘Unsecular’ 
activities included a political party’s ideological plank (in this case BJP’s Hindutva) in elections that 
had the effect of eroding the secular philosophy of the Constitution. «If a political party espousing a 
particular religion comes to power, that religion tends to become, in practice, the official religion. All 
other religions come to acquire a secondary status, at any rate, a less favourable position …under our 
Constitution, no party or organization can simultaneously be a political and a religious party. It has 
to be either»7.   
The judgements resulted in a paradox. The BJP was implicitly granted recognition as a 
political party (Hindutva judgement) and condemned as a religious party (Bommai judgement), 
though the court in Bommai maintained that no party could be a religious and a political party. How 
                                                 
3 Prabhoo vs. Kunte, (1996) 1 SCC 130:161, Para 43.  
4 A. Nauriya, “The Hindutva Judgments: A Warning Signal”, in  Economical and Political Weekly, 31, 1996, pp. 1013.  
5 Asserting that Hindutva was synonymous with nationalism and "Bharateeyatva," party leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee 
pointed out in  a public meeting that the concept did not merit further debate as the Supreme Court had defined it in 
totality in its judgment. (Times of India, June 7, 1996).   
6 Bommai vs. Union of India (1994) SC 1918.  
7 Ibid., p. 236  
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do we understand these inconsistencies in the court’s interpretations? Should we attribute it to the 
whims of individual judges? But of the three justices, one (J S Verma) had ruled in both sets of cases.   
Scholars have explained these contradictory rulings under the broad rubric of a ‘crisis of 
secularism’, caused variously by constitutional ambiguities, colonial rule, social justice concerns of a 
liberal democratic state, and the disjuncture between an elite-driven normative project and the 
demands imposed by requirements of democratic consent. 8  For instance, when the Constituent 
Assembly decided that India would not be a Hindu state, it did not specify what it meant for the 
country to be a secular one. The term ‘secularism’ itself was not incorporated until the 42nd 
Amendment in 1976. Other inconsistencies are that the Constitution exhorts the state to treat all 
religions with equal respect and simultaneously charges it to reform unequal religious practices 
(particularly in Hinduism), and correct historical wrongs perpetrated on the lowest castes (of Hindus) 
and groups through affirmative action in education, government jobs and political constituencies.9 
The Indian state seeks to separate religion and politics and also involves itself in the regulation, 
funding and administration of religious institutions.   
A more recent explanation comes from Charles Taylor who in A Secular Age87 argues that for 
purposes of understanding the struggle, rivalry, or debate between religion and unbelief in Latin 
Christendom, we have to understand religion as combining three dimensions of transcendence.   
  
 «It is our relation to a transcendent God which has been displaced at the centre of social life 
(Secularity I); it is faith in this God whose decline is tracked in these theories (Secularity II), and the 
third dimension is the emergence of new conditions of belief ... the sense that there is some good 
higher than, beyond human flourishing (Secularity III)»88.     
  
Taylor argues that with the rise of secularization, ‘exclusive humanism’ becomes an attractive 
option, but religion does not wither away or become privatized. Taylor is careful to limit his 
explanation to the Latin Christian world because “it is very hard to demonstrate that an “unbelieving 
ethos” could not have arisen in any other religion, nevertheless, it seems to me to be overwhelmingly 
                                                 
8 For more recent debates, see A. D. Needham, R. Sunder Rajan (Eds.), The Crisis of Secularism in India,  University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 2006.  
9 About 85% of Indians are Hindus and occupy a caste within a top-down hierarchy of Brahmin (priest), Kshatriya 
(warrior/King), Vaishya (trader) and Sudra (farming/lowest castes). The caste system not only determines the individual’s 
social status on the basis of the group to which he is born but also differentiates and assigns occupational and economic 
roles (especially in rural areas). See Louis Dumont’s classic Homo Hierarchicus, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1981, for a treatise on the organizing principles of the caste system and its implications.  87 C. Taylor, A Secular Age, 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 2007. 88 Ibid., p. 20.  
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plausible”10. The plausibility, for Taylor, derives from the absence of enabling conditions, which 
produced Secularity III in the modern West. He writes:  
  
«An age or society would then be secular or not, in virtue of the conditions of 
experience of and search for the spiritual. Obviously, where it stood in this dimension 
would have a lot to do with how secular it was in the second sense, which turns on levels 
of belief and practice, but there is no simple correlation between the two, as the case of the 
U.S. shows. As for the first sense, which concerns public space, this may be uncorrelated 
with both the others (as might be argued for the case of India). But I will maintain that in 
fact, in the Western case, the shift to public secularity has been part of what helped to 
bring on a secular age in my third sense In this meaning, as against sense 2, at least many 
milieux in the United States are secularized, and I would argue that the United States as a 
whole is. Clear contrast cases today would be the majority of Muslim societies, or the 
milieux in which the vast majority of Indians live»11.   
  
But is Taylor right to lump all the non-Christian societies into a single category?  Taylor’s and 
the other explanations do not highlight a more fundamental contradiction, namely how ‘Hinduism’ is 
imagined by the Constitution. As we shall see shortly, India epitomises a society where the notions 
of ‘religion’ and ‘belief’ and ‘disbelief’ are less unambiguous than in Taylor’s Latin Christendom, 
where a belief system (Hinduism) was given the epithet of ‘religion’ by the colonial power and by 
some Indian nationalists, and this definition was retained after independence in the country’s 
constitution and laws along with other competing and pre-existing notions of what the belief system 
constituted including a notion of Hinduism as ‘not religion’ and of the state governing a public space 
emptied of God. To explain the contradictions in the judiciary’s interpretations of Hindutva and 
Hinduism and in the Indian state’s management of religious diversity, the article draws on a concept 
used by Charles Taylor, namely ‘social imaginaries’ – the kind of collective understanding a group 
has to have in order to make sense of their practices. I argue that the contradictions stem from the 
inability of the Constitution to reconcile three different imaginaries of Hinduism – as a religion, 
culture and an ancient order. But these contradictions, while stoking discord, have also provided a 
buffer zone from which the state can achieve some sort of equi-distance (in Rajiv Bhargava’s terms), 
principled or otherwise, from such conflicts.   
                                                 
10 Ibid., p. 267.  
11 Ibid., pp. 3-4, italics mine.  
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In the next sections, I highlight three stylized imaginaries of Hinduism - as a religion, an 
ancient order, and as a western experiential category that is better replaced by the term ‘Indian 
culture’. I show how these imaginaries weave through the Constituent Assembly debates on the role 
of the new state vis a vis religion, and in the subsequent conflicting interpretations in the political and 
legal arenas. These imaginaries explain the different interpretations of the courts on the Hindutva 
cases.    
  
Social Imaginaries of Hinduism  
  
  «I speak of ‘imaginary’ (i) because I’m talking about the way ordinary people ‘imagine’ their 
social surroundings,” while  “(ii) theory is often the possession of a small minority,…what is 
interesting in the social imaginary is that it is shared by large groups of people, if not the whole 
society»12.   
    
If one adopts Taylor’s distinction between ‘theory’ and ‘social imaginary’, then the only way 
to assess a social imaginary would be to collect accounts of lived experiences of millions of Indians. 
It is also highly probable that these ethnographies will reveal the presence of not one, but multiple 
social imaginaries overlapping and jousting with each other. These imaginaries would include, among 
others, the state’s social imaginary constructed by a constitution and interpreted by the courts, 
religious leaders’ social imaginary disseminated through preaching and lectures and practices adopted 
by the followers, the lived experiences of different types (religions, castes, regions) of ordinary 
people, and the imaginaries of political leaders displayed through their election manifestoes and 
speeches and subscribed to by those who vote for them.13 Taylor’s own approach to experiencing the 
world and in recounting the transformation of social imaginaries, as Jon Butler points out, stresses 
ideas and theory more than experience and ordinary people. It is unclear as to who constitutes the 
“we” in a social imaginary in A Secular Age that «so seldom inquires about the social imaginaries of 
ordinary people … as opposed to the social imaginaries described and created by prominent 
thinkers»14   
                                                 
12 Ibid.,  pp. 171-172.  
13 As weak proxies for ethnographic work, I refer to colonial geographers, travellers and other accounts of the ‘Hindoo’, 
and to the biography of a Brahmin savant.   
14 J. Butler, “Disquieted History in A Secular Age,” in M. Warner et. al. (eds.), Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2010, p. 198.  
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This article eschews Taylor’s theory-social imaginary dichotomy and focuses on three stylized 
slices of experiences that have created overlapping and competing imaginaries of  






(i) Hinduism as a religion   
 Sindhu is the term used by ancient Greeks and Persians to referred to peoples (not religions) 
beyond the river Indus.15 European travellers and missionaries regarded Indian traditions as heathen 
or pagan, and called it ‘gentooism’, ‘the religion of the Hindus,’ and then ‘Hindooism’/ ‘Hinduism’ 
by the end of the eighteenth century. Can Hinduism be called a religion? Sociologist Emile Durkheim 
defined religion as a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, 
things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community 
called a Church, all those who adhere to them. Anthropologist Clifford Geertz viewed religion as a 
system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods and 
motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these 
conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.16 
These definitions imply that there are some conditions that are necessary for something to be called 
a religion.   
Three elements are identified as central to the role played by Europeans in the construction of 
Hinduism as a religion: a western Christian concept of religion, the idea that Indian religions formed 
one pan-Indian religion, and the needs of the colonial enterprise. Different religious phenomena came 
to be seen as parts of one religion, Hinduism, and the core was drawn from Brahmanism – with its 
texts and priests.17 These moves to create a unified religion in India were closely linked to the legal 
codification of the colonial subject. 18  Nineteenth century Indian intellectuals who resisted the 
                                                 
15 This section’s analysis draws from E. Bloch, M. Keppens, R. Hegde, Rethinking Religion in India: The colonial 
construction of Hinduism, Routledge, London, 2010.  
16 C. Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System”, in M. Banton (ed.) Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion, 
Tavistock Publications, London,1966.   
17 See articles in V. Dalmia, H. von Stietencron (eds.), Representing Hinduism: The Construction of Religious Traditions 
and National Identity, Sage, Delhi, 1995.  
18 G. Vishwanathan, “Colonialism and the Construction of Hinduism”, in G. Flood (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to 
Hinduism, John Wiley and Sons, Hoboken (NJ), 2008.  
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proselytization by Christian missionaries also engaged in constructing a Hindu religion, a modern 
Hinduism that would be respectable in the eyes of the world and would provide the basis for a morality 
of acting in the secular world. These reform movements led by and consisting mostly of intellectuals 
who were Brahmins and part of the elites, transformed Indian traditions into a unified religion, and 
are held to be precursors of the Hindu nationalists today.19   
While the constructivist view holds a dominant position, its critics argue that non-Muslim 
Indians shared a common identity in pre-colonial India20, and therefore such identity was coterminous 
with religious identity. Other shortcomings of the constructivists include ambiguity about the nature 
of the process of construction, lack of clarity on whether Brahmanism really exists or existed in India, 
and if it did exist, the absence of answers on why non-Brahmins accepted Brahmanism as their 
religion, and the absence of a clear relationship between the motives for the construction and the fact 
of the construction of Hinduism (Keppens and Bloch 2010).   
This imaginary of Hinduism as a religion is the one that Taylor refers to, and also informs the 
Bommai judgment discussed earlier. If this were the only imaginary, then Taylor would be right to 
say that public secularity (I) has not been achieved in India. Let us now turn to a Hinduism that bears 
no relation to religion.   
  
  (ii) Hinduism as an ancient order  
In The Last Brahmin, Rani Siva Sankara Sarma writes about the views held by his Brahmin 
savant-father whom he calls “the last Brahmin.”21 The narrator portrays the lived experience of a 
scholar of the Vedas, to give us a glimpse of a different imaginary. This ‘last Brahmin’ declares from 
his deathbed at the age of 80 that neither of his sons is eligible to perform his funeral rites because 
one (the narrator) is a non-believer, and the other (the narrator’s older brother) is a ‘Hindu convert’ 
because he espouses Hindu nationalism. The father declares that Brahmins are a people free of – or 
outside – religion; there is no place for the term ‘Hindu’ or ‘religion’ in the canonical Vedic tradition 
for the followers of the ancient order.   
Attempting to understand his father’s distinction between Brahmin and Hindu, the narrator 
asks whether the followers of the ancient order recognized the word Hinduism. The father replies: 
                                                 
19 R. Thapar, “Imaginged Religious Communities? Ancient History and the Modern Search for a Hindu Identity,” in 
Modern Asian Studies, 23, 1989, pp. 209-231.  
20 D.N. Lorenzen, “Who invented Hinduism?’, in Comparative Studies in Society and History, 1999, 41, pp. 630-659. In 
response to the question – what makes this identity into religious identity – Lorenzen replies that religions are associated 
with a particular emotion or emotional experience that corresponds to Otto’s mysterium tremendum et fascinans [a unique 
point of origin/a personal experience of the sacred], p. 28.  
21 R.S.S. Sarma, The Last Brahmin, trans. D. Venkat Rao, Permanent Black, New Delhi, 2007.  
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«On the banks of the sacred and serene Krishna river, at a convention of Pandits[scholars], the 
propriety and impropriety of the term “Hindu” came up for discussion. Then the noble and venerable 
savant [an illustrious scholar] … stated through illustrations that the terms Hinduism and Hindu were 
used first by foreigners, that these words are not related to Bharatiya (Indic) culture. However, 
grammarians concur that even phonic improprieties have verbal existences. Therefore, when 
something is absent in the discourse but prevalent in popular usage, the learned must remain 
indifferent towards such phonic improprieties. When followers of the ancient order who practice 
varna dharma [caste system] are called Hindus, one should accept this with similar indifference».22   
  
Here, the view of Hinduism as an ancient order is based not on religion, but on varna,  a 
classificatory system, that does not allow for entry or exit from the Order. There is no connection 
between temples and the Brahmins of the ancient order, or between the state and the reform of the 
classificatory stystem, nor is there any sympathy for Hindu nationalist ideology, which is dismissed 
as a proxy Christianity and as antagonistic to the aims of the ancient order.    
Adherents of this imaginary would say that Taylor’s Secularity I and II have no place in the 
context of Hinduism since God does not exist in public space, and they do not practice religious 
beliefs. They would also say that they are already engaged in Secularity III – the search for the 
spiritual.   
    
(iii) Hinduism is an imaginary entity/ Indianness as  a culture.  
The appropriateness of viewing Hinduism as a religion, and of Brahmanism as its basis is 
challenged by Balagangadhara who argues that ‘religion’ is better thought of as a model of 
‘explanation’ that applies only to the Jewish, Christian and Islamic worlds.23  This position echoes 
the views of several travellers and scholars from previous centuries who expressed their inability to 
understand indigenous practices in India through the lens of religion. Balagangadhara takes five 
characteristics of religion –  a scripture, a standard world view where claims are made on the origin 
on the world, an authority to settle conflicts, excommunication, and an organization to transmit – and 
shows how Hinduism does not possess any of these. For instance, the scriptures and texts present 
multiple stories of the origin of the world;  a Rig Veda hymn says, in the ultimate analysis, who 
created the world does not matter all that much   
                                                 
22 Ibid., p. 61.  





«There was neither non-existence nor existence then; there was neither the realm 
of space nor the sky which is beyond…Whence is this creation? The gods came afterwards, 
with the creation of the universe. Who then knows whence it has arisen? Whence this 
creation has arisen – perhaps it formed itself, or perhaps it did not – the one who looks 
down on it, in the highest heave, only he knows – or perhaps he does not know».24   
    
Balagangadhara argues that on other counts too -- no central concept of God, no sole prophet 
or founder, no authoritative scripture -- Hinduism does not qualify as religion. 25  So, what is 
Hinduism?  His reply is that it is not possible to formulate the question ‘If Hinduism is not a religion, 
what else is it?’ Neither does he replace ‘Hinduism’ with the term ‘culture’. Instead, his claim is the 
following:  Hinduism, the phenomenon constructed by the West, is an experiential entity only to the 
West and not to us. In this sense, Hinduism is not a part of the Indian culture. It has no existence 
outside of the western experience of India.26  For him, concepts of ‘secular’,  
‘secularization’ and ‘religion’ belong to the language of Western Christianity, and those Indian 
intellectuals and reformers who adopt these terms to discuss Hinduism are ‘theologians in a secular 
guise’. Instead, Balagangadhara prefers to interrogate the subject of an ‘Indian culture’, a culture 
without ‘religion’ in the Christian sense.   
For our purposes, Balagangadhara’s view can be categorised as an imaginary that sees  
Hinduism’s caste hierarchy as part of an ‘Indian culture’.106 Such an imaginary would explain the 
Hindutva judgment discussed at the beginning of the paper, where the Supreme Court equated  
Hinduism with ‘Indian culture’ and ‘a way of life’.   
Let us now examine the interplay between these three imaginaries in the Constituent  
Assembly’s debates on conversion.  
                                                 
24 The Poetry of Creation - Rig Veda Book 10 Hymn 129, (10.129), p. 358.  
25 This view seems not to take into consideration the fact that two centuries of a constructed Hindu religion ought to be 
infused in some fashion in the social imaginary of different groups of modern Hindu Indians. Balagangadhara makes the 
mistake of treating Christianity as the prototype of ‘religion’, when all one can say is Hinduism is not a religion like 
Christianity but one cannot say that Hinduism is not a religion, says Will Sweetman in Hinduism” and the “History of 
Religion”, Method and Theory in Study of Religion, Brill, Leiden, 15, 2003, pp. 329-353.  
26  S.N. Balagangadhara, “Ontological and epistemological commitments of ‘Hinduism’, March 5, 2011, 
http://www.hipkapi.com/2011/03/05/ontological-and-epistemological-commitments-of-hinduism-s-n-balagangadhara/  
106 The  idiom of culture was also used by V.D. Savarkar, an ideologue of the present day Hindu nationalists, in his book 
in 1922 titled Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? But he uses it differently from Balagangadhara. Savarkar combines territory 
(the land of the Indus) with Hindu culture and Hindu people to argue for a reinterpretation of the word Hindu. Thus 
culture, like the Brahminical world view, also has multiple imaginaries.     
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India’s Constitutional Imaginary  
  
The ‘We, the people…’ that constitutions often begin with, implies that the document contains 
a social (constitutional) imaginary of ‘the people’ of a country. As mentioned earlier, a major concern 
for the 207 member Indian Constituent Assembly, many of whom hailed from ordinary backgrounds, 
was how to douse the flames of religious strife between Hindus and Muslims resulting from the 
Partition of the country into India and Pakistan. The principle of separation of state and religion 
generated a lot of opposition within the CA. While the debates recognized the implicit need to separate 
those aspects of religious dissentions that could demolish democratic stability, there was little 
agreement on how to achieve this objective. Some saw a secular state as the separation of state and 
church (religion was not permitted in the public sphere). Others saw it as neutrality of the state towards 
religion, which could function in the public sphere. A third view maintained that while the state would 
treat all religions equally, the state had a duty to reform religious practices in line with principles of 
equality and justice. The texture of the debates in the CA reveals that the members utilized all three 
imaginaries to argue their case. Those who saw Hinduism as a way of life/culture/an ancient order 
found themselves on the same side and pitted against those who treated it as a religion. The 
overlapping and often contradictory pulls of the three imaginaries left their mark on the Indian 
constitution’s conception of the new state’s relationship with religion. If Hinduism was treated as a 
religion, how could the state conform to neutrality and separation of state and religion, and still reform 
unjust social practices within the Hindu caste system? If Hinduism was an ancient order based on the 
caste hierarchy, how could the state undertake social justice for the lowest castes? And if Hinduism 
was part of an Indian culture, how could the state bar it from political discourse? The constitution 
incorporated all three types of imaginaries, which sometimes coexisted and sometimes collided, 
producing a resilient buffer zone between the state and religion. The debate on proselytization and 
conversion in the CA illustrates the point.    
Most conversions in independent India occur among the lowest groups in the caste ladder, 
scheduled castes, and the indigenous peoples, scheduled tribes who aim to improve their low social 
standing by converting to religions – Buddhism, Islam and Christianity – that promise ‘equality’. 
Conversion presupposes a prior element of propagation. The question of whether the Indian state 
ought to allow a fundamental right to propagate provoked heated discussions in the Constituent  
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Assembly on 3rd December 1948. The clause discussed was ‘the right freely to profess, practice and 
propagate religion’.  
One view was that the state ought not to permit the right to propagate. Two delegates from 
opposite ends of the spectrum converged on this conclusion. Tajamul Husain, a Muslim who espoused 
the classic liberal approach of seeing religion as a private affair between man and his God said: «If 
you start propagating religion in this country, you will become nuisance to others ... I submit, Sir, that 
this is a secular State and a secular state should not have anything to do with religion».27 A Hindu 
delegate, Loknath Misra, said that secularism itself was a «slippery phrase» and «a device to bypass 
the ancient culture of the land».28 He recommended either banning all religions or choosing Hinduism 
as the state religion. By allowing propagation, said Misra, the Constitution was paving the way for 
the complete annihilation of Hindu culture, the Hindu way of life and manners.29 His reasoning was 
that it was not really possible to separate religion from “the ancient culture” of the land.   
Those favouring a right to propagate argued their case either on the grounds of a quid pro quo 
for minorities, or on the assumption of benign and reasoned attempts at conversion or as an integral 
part of the right to freedom of expression. Lakshmi Kant Maitra, a Hindu, wanted the state to allow 
propagation because he said that minorities such as Christians, had given up their claims to reserved 
seats (affirmative action) in the state legislatures in exchange for a right to propagate. Hence, the 
majority community «should allow this privilege to the minority community and have it for 
themselves as well».30 These debates highlight an ambiguity – how to create a level playing field 
between proselytizing religions and something (Hinduism) that was seen as a religion and as an 
ancient culture which one entered by birth and exited by death – that the CA was unable to resolve. 
The Indian Constitution included the right to propagate (subject to some restrictions) in the 
fundamental right to religious freedom.   
The CA members thus used all three imaginaries in the construction of state-religion relations, 
peppering the Constitution with contradictions. The Constitution did not define the terms,  
‘Hindu’, ‘religion’, ‘secular’ and ‘minorities’, leaving it to the courts and legislative amendments to 
do so. In the next section, we shall see how these contradictions produced by the three imaginaries 
arose to bedevil the judiciary’s interpretations of Hinduism and consequently its relationship with a 
‘secular’ state.  
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 Judiciary’s Interpretations of Hinduism  
  
(i) Hinduism as a religion and as a culture  
The sect would be ‘Hindu’ if the individuals were ‘Hindus’, said a Constitution Bench of the 
Supreme Court in a case that concerned the identification of an institution as a Hindu institution.31 
The judges rejected the notion of Hinduism as a religion, and preferred to see it as a culture. Referring 
to  the territorial, not the creedal significance of the term, the judges said that the usual tests applied 
to a recognized religion or religious creed would turn out to be inadequate in dealing with Hindu 
religion.   
  
 “When we think of the Hindu religion, we find it difficult, if not impossible, to 
define Hindu religion or even adequately describe it. Unlike other religions in the world, 
the Hindu religion does not claim any one prophet…in fact, it does not appear to satisfy 
the narrow traditional features of any religion or creed. It may broadly be described as 
a way of life and nothing more.”  
  
By 1976, the court gave up on trying to define ‘Hindu’.  «It is a matter of common knowledge 
that Hinduism embraces within itself so many diverse forms of beliefs, faiths, practices and worship 
that it is difficult to define the term ‘Hindu’ with precision».112 The legal definition of Hinduism, as 
legal scholar Marc Galanter points out, is neither a measure of religious belief nor a description of 
social behavior as much as a civil status describing everyone subjected to the application of “Hindu 
law’ in the areas reserved for personal law.   
  
(ii) Hinduism as a religion and as an ancient order  
In a recent judgment on whether ‘Jains’ could be classified as a ‘minority’, the apex court tried 
but failed to reconcile the imaginaries of Hinduism as a religion and as an ancient order. The rationale 
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underpinning the dismissal of the appeal to notify the ‘Jain’ community as a minority highlights the 
ambiguities introduced by the two imaginaries of Hinduism.32    
«The word 'Hindu' conveys the image of diverse groups of communities living in India. If you 
search for a person by name Hindu, he is unidentifiable. He can be identified only on the basis of his 
caste as upper caste Brahmin, Kshatriya or Vaish or of lower caste described in ancient India as 
Shudras».   
 Hinduism, the court said could be called a general religion and common faith of India whereas 
Jainism was a special religion formed on the basis of quintessence of Hindu religion. «Their only 
difference from Hindus is that Jains do not believe in any creator like God but worship only the perfect 
human-being whom they called Tirathankar». The judgment’s rationale was that the caste basis of 
Hindu society meant that no section or distinct group of people could claim to be in majority. «All 
are minorities amongst Hindus. Many of them claim such status because of their small number and 
expect protection from the State on the ground that they are backward».    
 These muddled interpretations replicated themselves in cases dealing with conversions from 
Hinduism and the retention of affirmative action benefits by such converts. In pursuance of its 
mandate to deliver social justice to historically discriminated groups, the Constitution provides 
affirmative action in political constituencies, government jobs and educational institutions to 
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Could those who retained their affiliations to their old 
communities after converting to another religion (e.g. Christianity) retain their constitutional 
privileges to affirmative action? The court said yes in the case of scheduled tribe converts to other 
religions, but no to scheduled caste converts.33 For scheduled caste converts, the Supreme Court laid 
down the norm in Arumugam v Rajagopal, where it said that a caste «is more a social combination 
than a religious group». This position highlights the conflict between two imaginaries of Hindusim – 
as an ancient order and as a religion. It said that renunciation of Hinduism and adoption of another 
religious faith did not mean that a person ceased to be a member of the caste in which he was born.    
«A caste may consist not only of persons professing Hindu religion but also 
persons professing some other religion as well, conversion from Hinduism to that other 
religion may not involve loss of caste, because even persons professing such other 
religion can be members of the caste [caste as an ancient classificatory system – my 
interpretation]. This might happen where caste is based on economic or occupational 
characteristics and not on religious identity or the cohesion of the caste as a social 
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group is so strong that conversion into another religion does not operate to snap the 
bond between the convert and the social group».34   
  
The above discussion makes the inconsistencies between the court’s rulings in the Hindutva 
cases and the Bommai judgment more comprehensible. These contradictory judgments can be 
understood within the context of the three imaginaries of Hinduism. Neither the Constitution nor the 
Representation of People Act (1951) defines ‘religion’.  The judges in the Hindutva case reviewed 
previous rulings on what constituted a ‘matter of religion’, who decided it, and to a lesser extent what 
constituted a reasonable restriction based on ‘public order, morality and health’. They found a mixed 
bag of rulings. Initially, the courts had allowed religious denominations to decide what constituted a 
matter of religion,35 but  had made a distinction between the right to manage affairs in matters of 
religion (a fundamental right of the religious denomination) and the administration of property (a 
secular function), subject to state supervision. Later, the court gave itself the right to determine what 
could or could not be seen as a religious practice, and whether a particular rite was regarded as 
essential by the tenets of a particular religion.36 Social justice concerns for the scheduled castes and 
tribes compelled the court to curtail the freedom of denominational authorities in 'matters of religion'. 
For instance, the court upheld the Madras Temple Entry Authorization Act (1948) which allowed 
scheduled castes to enter a Hindu temple.37 Non-essential activities that could be controlled by the 
state came to include appointment of priests and state legislation on administration of religious 
institutions.38 Thus, as a result of the ambiguities introduced by the three imaginaries on Hinduism, 
the judiciary gradually expanded the influence of the state over issues that were initially interpreted 
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Hinduism and A Secular Age  
  
The preceding discussion makes it clear that we can understand the troubled relationship of 
the Indian state to the management of competing pluralisms only if we parse out the competing 
imaginaries of Hinduism.  The immanent frame of the imaginary of someone like the Brahmin savant 
who views Hinduism as an ancient order or someone like Balagangadhara who talks about ‘Indian 
culture’ would not include Taylor’s trio of secularities but could fit into his notion of transcendence 
and going beyond this life infusing Secularity III. The frame of a Jawaharlal Nehru or B.R.Ambedkar 
who incorporated a normative project of secularization into the Constitution and removed religion 
from politics would contain the hope of moving from Secularity I to III.   
The Indian case also complicates the notion of social imaginaries used by Taylor in A Secular 
Age. Concepts of religion/secular, church/state, natural/supernatural could be seen as binaries that 
originate within Christian theology and do not completely explain or make sense in the non-Christian 
world. Taylor, perhaps, would not disagree with this statement.  In Warner et al., Taylor admits that 
he «has neglected the way in which western understandings of religion were informed through the 
precolonial and the colonial encounters with other parts of the world».40  
Other scholars have analyzed the internal complexity of Hinduism as ‘thick and thin religions’ 
(Sudipta Kaviraj), and as ‘religion and faith’ (Ashis Nandy). Let us examine Kaviraj’s analysis 
because parts of it resonate with the distinction between Hinduism as an ancient order/way of 
life/culture, and Hinduism as a religion. Kaviraj makes a distinction between thick religion – its 
internal contents are a vast catalogue of beliefs about large and small things and all of them are crucial 
to the practice of that particular faith – and thin religion. For Kaviraj, the religion of Hindu nationalists 
is thin because it is entirely indifferent to the sectarian practices of everyday worship;  
«indeed its primary purpose is to make them redundant … There is a certain paradox in the way it 
orders the world: it uses a broad and inclusive movement for all Hindus and groups linked to Hinduism 
by their origin; but the entire purpose is to harden and inflame the boundary between this expansive 
Hinduism and other selected adversaries, particularly Muslims».41 He points out the irony that the 
primary purpose of this inclusion is exclusion of other communities «from a sense of participating in 
a historically common and interactive religious culture».42  
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For Kaviraj, an inverse relationship exists between the thickness of religious beliefs and the 
size of religious communities. In India, it is thin religion that is pervasive, political (not ethical), 
intolerant (not accommodating) and has the goal of amassing mundane power (not indifferent to 
power). «It is misleading to hold that in India either religion is becoming stronger, or the 
secularization thesis is disconfirmed».43 He concludes that  the story of Indian modernity, particularly 
of Hindu religion, shows a process in which a thin Hindu identity seeks to overcome segmentation 
and produce a collective agency to menace minorities and demand a homogenizing and intolerant 
version of nationalism. 44  While Kaviraj’s analysis explains the nature of ‘Hindu’ in Hindu 
nationalism, it subsumes the notion of Hinduism as an ancient order within the category of religion.    
Let us return to a dialogue between a Hindu official and a spiritual leader from The Last 
Brahmin that explains the notion of Hinduism as an ancient order. «For a genuine practitioner of the 
ancient dharma, his faith is the same as his mode of living. In his life it is woven into every context.  
For him there are no separable categories such as social matters and matters of faith».45   
 Perhaps this faith articulated by the Last Brahmin is the same as the faith alluded to by Ashis Nandy, 
but different in form and content to the one explicated in Kaviraj’s ‘thick religion’. Sarma, the narrator 
of the Last Brahmin analyses Hinduism in modern India as the cultural consequence of colonialism, 
as a disguised form of Christian monotheism. Within this Hinduism is subsumed Nandy’s Hinduism 
as an ideology, Kaviraj’s thin religion, and perhaps parts of Kaviraj’s thick religion. So what are we 
left with in Hinduism as an ancient order as outlined by Sarma? It is a Brahmin tradition, or a social 
imaginary pertaining to Brahmins, that too a particular type of Brahmin. But it is a powerful one and 
seems to have influenced apex court judges who tend to be upper caste (Brahmins and Kshatriyas) 
Hindus. At the same time, it offers us access to a distinct indigenous perspective informed by Sanskrit 
cultural heritage and literary tradition.46  




The ambiguity introduced by the multiple imaginaries of Hinduism has both weakened and 
strengthened Indian democracy and secularism. Taylor speaks of  «belief and unbelief, not as rival 
                                                 
43 Ibid., p. 350.  
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theories», but as “the different kinds of lived experience involved in understanding your life in one 
way or the other, on what it’s like to live as a believer or an unbeliever»47. The imaginaries of 
Hinduism as a culture and as an Ancient Order are forms of lived experience, which pertain to a third 
category – one who is neither a believer nor an unbeliever. The existence of this category has 
simultaneously problematized the state’s efforts to manage diversity and increased concerns among 
scholars and others about a crisis of secularism in India, but has also created a buffer or a zone of 
ambiguity for the state and prevented it from being torn apart by the fierce battles between majority 
and minority religions, and between co-religionists. While Taylor’s concept of social imaginaries 
helps us understand the production of these ambiguities, the trajectory of secularities expounded in A 
Secular Age are less relevant to the Indian context.   
Charles Taylor in Modern Social Imaginaries explains the notion of a moral order as carrying 
a definition not only of what is right, but of the context in which it makes sense to strive for and hope 
to realize the right (at least partially).48 One type of moral order, he says, is based on the idea of the 
Law of a people, which has governed this people and which, in a sense defines it as a people. The 
other type of moral order is organized around a notion of a hierarchy in society that expresses and 
corresponds to a hierarchy in the cosmos. In the Indian case, the imaginaries support different types 
of moral orders that conflict with each other and with the state’s goals. The jostling for dominance by 
the different imaginaries has acted as a check on the perpetual dominance by one imaginary. For 
instance, with the election of the NDA coalition led by the Hindu nationalist BJP in 1996, concerns 
bloomed about the dominance of Hindu nationalism, but by the time the UPA-led coalition took over 
in the first decade of the 21st century, the specter of muscular Hindu nationalism was less threatening. 
Today, the ascendance of the Narendra Modi-led BJP government in 2014 has renewed the fears about 
the exclusion and even victimization of non-Hindus on the one hand, and on the other hand, also 
produced the hope that a focus on economic revival would inhibit the exclusionary elements of 
Hindutva.   
While a Tayloresque trajectory from Secularity 1 to 3 does not hold explanatory weight for  
India, Taylor’s statement about India being a country that has not yet emptied its public space of 
religion is partially correct. About 90% of adult Indians surveyed in a Gallup poll in 2009 said that 
religion was an important part of their daily lives, but from our preceding discussion, it is unclear 
which imaginary of Hinduism they are referring to.49   
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What can the state do to tackle the ambiguities?  Taylor, in The Power of Religion in the Public 
Sphere50, argues that the point of state neutrality is to avoid favouring or disfavouring not just 
religious positions, but any basic position, religious or nonreligious. Institutional formulae like the 
separation of church and state are at best, shorthand heuristics. Instead, constructing a democratic life 
together may depend more on being able to engage in shared positive pursuits such as exploring ways 
to work for common goals such as liberty, equality etc. As Craig Calhoun says in his conclusion in 
the same book, this suggests that we should not understand the public sphere entirely in terms of 
argumentation about the truth value of propositions, but as a realm of creativity and social imaginaries 
in which citizens give shared form to their lives together, a realm of exploration, experiment and 
partial agreements. Scholars like Habermas (who did not discuss religion in his earlier work), Charles 
Taylor and Judith Butler agree that excluding religion from the public sphere would undermine the 
solidarity and creativity they seek for citizens.  This is not to deny the divisive force of religion or to 
ignore the insidious effects of religiously biased policies adopted by governments led by parties 
espousing chauvinist ideologies.  Compared to the past, the recent diminishing relevance of caste and 
religion in winning elections in India is an indicator that the multiple imaginaries associated with 
Hinduism may have allowed religion to remain in the public sphere without necessarily undermining, 
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